Andy Mok

"The Party Controls the Guns"

Despite being the legitimate face of China in the anomalous world, the PCAAO is not a formal government apparatus. Instead, like many other powerful institutions in the party-state, the PCAAO is subordinated to the Communist Party, instead of the State Council. PCAAO bosses directly answer to the country's leader not for his position as the President of China, but for his position as the General Secretary of the Party. Despite its paramilitary outlook, the PCAAO is not controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC), the all-powerful party apparatus that control the PLA. Both organisations occupy the top place in Chinese political structure as equals.

There are clear advantages to that arrangement. For instances, PCAAO operations are able to circumvent international laws which are only applicable to government bodies, or establish channels with foreign authorities which otherwise require formal (and inefficient) state to state diplomacy. Domestically, it also allow the Committee to get around national laws, thought the dominating position of the Party over the state as well as the prevalent guanxi culture makes it largely irrelevant.

Love - hate relations

At the first glance, relations between the PCAAO and the PLA are tense. The PLA has never forgiven the Committee for the humiliation it suffered during the Korean War, when it lost the control over all its anomalous assets to the PCAAO in a vicious power struggle. Over the following decades, both services would clash with each other behind closed doors, with major act of hostilities being masked by concurrent political instabilities, natural disasters, civil unrest, etc. Recently, for instance, the PLA made a power grab on the Mobile Formation by using the ongoing military reform, with the PCAAO retaliated by eliminating key military figures in the guise of anti-corruption campaign.

However, the real picture is more complex. The nature of PCAAO operation dictates that its interest collides with the military as much as it coincides. For all its anomalous strength, the PCAAO remains a "civilian" organisation with limited military capability, which predisposes it to seek helps from the PLA from time to time. Importantly, there is great incentive to maintain as least a facade of unity before the General Secretary. Should the GenSec intervenes, it will inevitably leads to humiliation and embarrassment to all parties involved, more so to the loser. Indeed, as in many authoritarian states, it is often the most efficient way to get things done.

Grassroots dynamics is also at work here. The phrase guanxi denotes "connection" or "interpersonal network", an essential element in Chinese institutional culture. It includes anything from private acquiescence with a key figure outside of organisational framework, to outright bribery. Although some sees it as corruption, other finds it an useful "lubricant" in between rigid organisational boundaries. For the PCAAO and the PLA, this proves to be true. Grudge in the top leadership does not prevent low level (and more often than not, young) cadres from exchanging favors with their counterparts in the other side. As long as no one is looking, local MF heads are happy to work with local PLA commander in matters such as security, training, etc, as does past comrades-in-arm who now find themselves on different side. In some cases, it is the only way to get results in some underfunded offices neglected by PCAAO's vast bureaucratic machine.

The muscles

PCAAO paramilitary force is made up of the Anomaly Guard and the Mobile Formation. The divide superficially resembles the People's Armed People (PAP) organisation but with a few key differences.

Anomaly Guard

The Anomaly Guard is organised along territorial line like the PAP, but it is much smaller than the nation-wide gendarmerie force. Whereas the PAP Internal Guard was organised up to the provincial Zongdui level (Division) level, the largest AG unit is Dadui (Battalion), which control cluster of sites across several provinces.

Mobile Formation

Considered the iron fist of the PCAAO, the Mobile Formation is the primary muscle force responsible for searching, seizing, or engaging anomaly within the Chinese border. It has its origin in the PLA. During the "Million Men Demobilization" reform of late 1980s, the PLA was significantly downsized. Most demobilised soldiers were transferred away to form the nascent PAP, but a single motorised division was given to the PCAAO. Over the years, the division was consolidated and reformed into the present Mobile Formation of PCAAO.

Unlike the Anomaly Guard, MF unit names follows the PLA naming convention. For example, division is referred to as Shi instead of Zongdui.

In 2011, the Mobile Formation retained the original motorized infantry division template. It commanded three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and other battalion-level support elements. As its name suggested, the division went to battle on trucks and fought dismounted. A key weakness here was the lack of armored vehicle. Therefore, the Mobile Formation often found itself in need of PLA help when they meet heavy resistance, something that played into the PCAAO-PLA political rivalry.

Anomaly-197 provides the MF with a sustainable source of quality manpower. Despite its experimental nature, as much as 1/3 of all rank and file strength is filled by 197-1 instances, with the rest drew from discharged PLA servicemen, police, etc. Each company possess one 197-1 line platoon, whose primary role is to serve as the point element in manoeuvre or the "tip of the spear" in assault - dangerous missions where mass casualty is expected. It is hypothesized that this tactic was evolved to compensate the lacking of armoured vehicles.

MF armament follows a top-down approach. Support weapons (Mortars, AGL, HMGs, etc) are concentrated in the battalion level, and is distributed to the companies if needed. As a rule of thumb, MF unit is a level weaker in firepower than ASF/ NATO counterpart. i.e. An ASF platoon can match an unsupported MF company in a firefight.

In 2017, the Mobile Formation follows the new Combined Arms Brigade structure of the PLA, with the addition of other arms for versatile missions. As a result, it becomes significantly more independent from the PLA. The present MF commands three Combined Arms Battalions (Light/ Medium/ Heavy), an air assault Battalion, an artillery battalion, an AAA battalion, an support service battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and a maintenance battalion.

Political Officer

In true communist fashion, political officers exists in all unit level above the platoon and they co-heads an unit with the unit commander. Command power is artificially halved between the commander and the political officer. Beside indoctrination and personnel administration, the political officer also co-sign a commander's order, which otherwise is not authorised to be carried out. A commander issuing orders without it will be required to explain himself at length after the action.

At first glance, the "dual command" system seems to be an inefficient legacy from a bygone-era. Many attributes it to the need of 'watching over' the commander, as PCAAO commander is largely drawn from the pool of retired PLA officers. What is not immediately apparent is the fact that the political officer is typically the most educated leader in his unit. While it may not means much in conventional combat, he is more understanding of the often intellect-heavy mission his job entails than the commander, who mostly come from the rank without receiving formal education. A good PO is expected to serve as a bridge between the "lab boy", foreigner, the brass, his men on the one side, and the commander on the other side. What is stereotypically perceived as a "watcher - being watched" relationship are more often than not a "book nerd - tough veteran" or "good cop - bad cop" or even "pen pusher - actual worker" relationship in reality.

Mobile Formation Battalion (2011)

HQ

  • Battalion commander (Colonel to senior colonel)

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MG Company

  • 1 X AAMG platoon: 2 squads, 3 X 12.7mm QJZ-85 AAMG each
  • 1 X HMG platoon: 2 squads, 3 X 12.7mm QJZ-89 HMG each
  • 1 X AGL platoon: 2 squads, 3 X 35mm QLZ-87 AGL each

Gun Company

  • 2 X mortar platoons: 3 squads, 1 X 82mm PP-87 mortar each
  • 1 X AT platoon: 3 squads, 1 X 120mm PF-98 squad (battalion tripod configuration) each
  • numerous PF-89 80mm disposable light AT weapon.

3 X infantry companies

Infantry company

HQ

  • Company commander (major to lieutenant colonel)
  • Zhidongyuan (political instructor)
  • Deputy company commander
  • Company Sergeant (XO)
  • Quartermaster
  • Radioman
  • Medic

Kitchen squad
3 X rifle platoons

Infantry platoon

Platoon leader (lieutenant to captain), QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
1 X rifle squad (197-1 instance)
2 X rifle squad

Rifle squad (197-1, 9 instances) X 1

  • Squad leader, QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • Assistant leader, QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • Machinegunner, QBB-95 LMG, 225 rounds in 3 drums.
  • Assistant machinegunner, unarmed. 300 rounds in 4 drums.
  • AT soldier, 120mm PF-98 heavy rocket launcher.
  • Assistant AT soldier, 2 rounds in the backpack (1 HEAT and 1 HE). QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • 3 X Rifleman, QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags

Rifle squad (human, 9 men) X 2

  • Squad leader, QBZ-95-1, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • Assistant leader, QBZ-95-1, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • Machinegunner, QBB-95 LMG, 225 rounds in 3 drums.
  • Assistant machinegunner, unarmed. 300 rounds in 4 drums.
  • AT soldier, 40mm Type-69 Rocket Launcher (=RPG-7), 3 rounds in the backpack; QSZ-92, 45 rounds in 3 mags.
  • Assistant AT soldier, 3 RPG rounds in the backpack. QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • 2 X Rifleman, QBZ-95-1 150 rounds in 5 mags.
  • Sharpshooter, QBU-88, 100 rounds in 10 mags.
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