"The Party Controls the Guns"
Despite being the legitimate face of China in the anomalous world, the PCAAO is not a formal government apparatus. Instead, like many other powerful institutions in the party-state, the PCAAO is subordinated to the Communist Party, instead of the State Council. PCAAO bosses directly answer to the country's leader not for his position as the President of China, but for his position as the General Secretary of the Party. Despite its paramilitary outlook, the PCAAO is not controlled by the Central Military Commission (CMC), the all-powerful party apparatus that control the PLA. Both organisations occupy the top place in Chinese political structure as equals.
There are clear advantages to that arrangement. For instances, PCAAO operations are able to circumvent international laws which are only applicable to government bodies, or establish channels with foreign authorities which otherwise require formal (and inefficient) state to state diplomacy. Domestically, it also allow the Committee to get around national laws, thought the dominating position of the Party over the state as well as the prevalent guanxi culture makes it largely irrelevant.
Love - hate relations
At the first glance, relations between the PCAAO and the PLA are tense. The PLA has never forgiven the Committee for the humiliation it suffered during the Korean War, when it lost the control over all its anomalous assets to the PCAAO in a vicious power struggle. Over the following decades, both services would clash with each other behind closed doors, with major act of hostilities being masked by concurrent political instabilities, natural disasters, civil unrest, etc. Recently, for instance, the PLA made a power grab on the Mobile Formation by using the ongoing military reform, with the PCAAO retaliated by eliminating key military figures in the guise of anti-corruption campaign.
However, the real picture is more complex. The nature of PCAAO operation dictates that its interest collides with the military as much as it coincides. For all its anomalous strength, the PCAAO remains a "civilian" organisation with limited military capability, which predisposes it to seek helps from the PLA from time to time. Importantly, there is great incentive to maintain as least a facade of unity before the General Secretary. Should the GenSec intervenes, it will inevitably leads to humiliation and embarrassment to all parties involved, more so to the loser. Indeed, as in many authoritarian states, it is often the most efficient way to get things done.
Grassroots dynamics is also at work here. The phrase guanxi denotes "connection" or "interpersonal network", an essential element in Chinese institutional culture. It includes anything from private acquiescence with a key figure outside of organisational framework, to outright bribery. Although some sees it as corruption, other finds it an useful "lubricant" in between rigid organisational boundaries. For the PCAAO and the PLA, this proves to be true. Grudge in the top leadership does not prevent low level (and more often than not, young) cadres from exchanging favors with their counterparts in the other side. As long as no one is looking, local MF heads are happy to work with local PLA commander in matters such as security, training, etc, as does past comrades-in-arm who now find themselves on different side. In some cases, it is the only way to get results in some underfunded offices neglected by PCAAO's vast bureaucratic machine.
The muscles
PCAAO paramilitary force is made up of the Anomaly Guard and the Mobile Formation. The divide superficially resembles the People's Armed People (PAP) organisation but with a few key differences.
Anomaly Guard
The Anomaly Guard is organised along territorial line like the PAP, but it is much smaller than the nation-wide gendarmerie force. Whereas the PAP Internal Guard was organised up to the provincial Zongdui level (Division) level, the largest AG unit is Dadui (Battalion), which control cluster of sites across several provinces.
Mobile Formation
Considered the iron fist of the PCAAO, the Mobile Formation is the primary muscle force responsible for searching, seizing, or engaging anomaly within the Chinese border. It has its origin in the PLA. During the "Million Men Demobilization" reform of late 1980s, the PLA was significantly downsized. Most demobilised soldiers were transferred away to form the nascent PAP, but a single motorised division was given to the PCAAO. Over the years, the division was consolidated and reformed into the present Mobile Formation of PCAAO.
Unlike the Anomaly Guard, MF unit names follows the PLA naming convention. For example, division is referred to as Shi instead of Zongdui.
In 2011, the Mobile Formation retained the original motorized infantry division template. It commanded three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and other battalion-level support elements. As its name suggested, the division went to battle on trucks and fought dismounted. A key weakness here was the lack of armored vehicle. Therefore, the Mobile Formation often found itself in need of PLA help when they meet heavy resistance, something that played into the PCAAO-PLA political rivalry.
Anomaly-197 provides the MF with a sustainable source of quality manpower. Despite its experimental nature, as much as 1/3 of all rank and file strength is filled by 197-1 instances, with the rest drew from discharged PLA servicemen, police, etc. Each company possess one 197-1 line platoon, whose primary role is to serve as the point element in manoeuvre or the "tip of the spear" in assault - dangerous missions where mass casualty is expected. It is hypothesized that this tactic was evolved to compensate the lacking of armoured vehicles.
MF armament follows a top-down approach. Support weapons (Mortars, AGL, HMGs, etc) are concentrated in the battalion level, and is distributed to the companies if needed. As a rule of thumb, MF unit is a level weaker in firepower than ASF/ NATO counterpart. i.e. An ASF platoon can match an unsupported MF company in a firefight.
In 2017, the Mobile Formation follows the new Combined Arms Brigade structure of the PLA, with the addition of other arms for versatile missions. As a result, it becomes significantly more independent from the PLA. The present MF commands three Combined Arms Battalions (Light/ Medium/ Heavy), an air assault Battalion, an artillery battalion, an AAA battalion, an support service battalion, a reconnaissance battalion and a maintenance battalion.
Political Officer
In true communist fashion, political officers exists in all unit level above the platoon and they co-heads an unit with the unit commander. Command power is artificially halved between the commander and the political officer. Beside indoctrination and personnel administration, the political officer also co-sign a commander's order, which otherwise is not authorised to be carried out. A commander issuing orders without it will be required to explain himself at length after the action.
At first glance, the "dual command" system seems to be an inefficient legacy from a bygone-era. Many attributes it to the need of 'watching over' the commander, as PCAAO commander is largely drawn from the pool of retired PLA officers. What is not immediately apparent is the fact that the political officer is typically the most educated leader in his unit. While it may not means much in conventional combat, he is more understanding of the often intellect-heavy mission his job entails than the commander, who mostly come from the rank without receiving formal education. A good PO is expected to serve as a bridge between the "lab boy", foreigner, the brass, his men on the one side, and the commander on the other side. What is stereotypically perceived as a "watcher - being watched" relationship are more often than not a "book nerd - tough veteran" or "good cop - bad cop" or even "pen pusher - actual worker" relationship in reality.
Mobile Formation Battalion (2011)
HQ
- Battalion commander (Colonel to senior colonel)
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MG Company
- 1 X AAMG platoon: 2 squads, 3 X 12.7mm QJZ-85 AAMG each
- 1 X HMG platoon: 2 squads, 3 X 12.7mm QJZ-89 HMG each
- 1 X AGL platoon: 2 squads, 3 X 35mm QLZ-87 AGL each
Gun Company
- 2 X mortar platoons: 3 squads, 1 X 82mm PP-87 mortar each
- 1 X AT platoon: 3 squads, 1 X 120mm PF-98 squad (battalion tripod configuration) each
- numerous PF-89 80mm disposable light AT weapon.
3 X infantry companies
Infantry company
HQ
- Company commander (major to lieutenant colonel)
- Zhidongyuan (political instructor)
- Deputy company commander
- Company Sergeant (XO)
- Quartermaster
- Radioman
- Medic
Kitchen squad
3 X rifle platoons
Infantry platoon
Platoon leader (lieutenant to captain), QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
1 X rifle squad (197-1 instance)
2 X rifle squad
Rifle squad (197-1, 9 instances) X 1
- Squad leader, QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- Assistant leader, QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- Machinegunner, QBB-95 LMG, 225 rounds in 3 drums.
- Assistant machinegunner, unarmed. 300 rounds in 4 drums.
- AT soldier, 120mm PF-98 heavy rocket launcher.
- Assistant AT soldier, 2 rounds in the backpack (1 HEAT and 1 HE). QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- 3 X Rifleman, QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags
Rifle squad (human, 9 men) X 2
- Squad leader, QBZ-95-1, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- Assistant leader, QBZ-95-1, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- Machinegunner, QBB-95 LMG, 225 rounds in 3 drums.
- Assistant machinegunner, unarmed. 300 rounds in 4 drums.
- AT soldier, 40mm Type-69 Rocket Launcher (=RPG-7), 3 rounds in the backpack; QSZ-92, 45 rounds in 3 mags.
- Assistant AT soldier, 3 RPG rounds in the backpack. QBZ-95, 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- 2 X Rifleman, QBZ-95-1 150 rounds in 5 mags.
- Sharpshooter, QBU-88, 100 rounds in 10 mags.
Report No.: Zhongji (2011) No. 1023
Author: Zhang Yen, Chief Investigator, Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)
Recipients:
- Fang Yu, Chief of Xinjiang Department, People's Committee for the Acquisition of Anomalous Objects (PCAAO)
- Xu Bing, Liaison Officer, Central Military Commission (CMC)
Persons Involved:
- Captain Hong Jun, Commander of 1st Company, 129th Battalion, Mobile Formation, PCAAO
- Captain Li Shaoqing, Political Instructor of 1st Company, 129th Battalion, Mobile Formation, PCAAO
Subject: Investigation on Commander Hong's invocation of emergency authority under Article 58 of PCAAO Regulations on Political Works. ("Article 58")
Abstract
This report describes the finding of an investigation on the conducts of Company Commander Hong Jun during the Recovery Operation on ██/██/2011 in ██████ ████, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the formal report of which is enclosed in Attachment Jia.
During the course of that operation, Commander Hong invoked Article 58's provision of emergency authority, which allowed him to override the authority of Instructor Li Shaoqing, the company's political officer. As per to Article 58, the invocation of emergency authority warrants a review session in the unit's Party committee, wherein the commander is required to explain his action before the battalion command. However, the CMC filed a demand via our liaison office there for transferring the matter to a formal investigation by the CCDI, which I headed.
My investigation leads to the conclusion that Commander Hong's action was justified under the circumstance, and did not constitute a conscious attempt to undermine the Party's control over the armed services.
To compile this report, I obtained testimony from Commander Hong, Instructor Li, and a number of witnesses who saw combat in ██████ ████. Key excerpts of their interview logs are selected and quoted in this document. Copies of the full logs are enclosed in Attachment Yi to Wu.
Testimony of Commander Hong
Log introducing his character as a tough old veteran. End at first contact.
Narrator text on the big picture:
- Night
- Largely flat rocky terrain. Large open area constitutes the main avenue of approach. Sparse woodland covers the west side. Rocky depression on the east some distance from the road. Hill on the north is the only vantage point.
Ambush > counter-ambush meeting engagement. 1st Platoon (1PLT) which was the company point element was caught in a L shape ambush. Fire was poured from both the treeline (the long arm of L) and the northern hill (sniper from the short arm).
Testimony of Platoon Leader ████ (1PL)
Interview conducted in a hospital
1PL hit the ground under sniper fire from the north. The entire 1PLT got down immediately and tried to seek cover somewhere far away under accurate fire. Comment on good choice of ambush ground, but points out it was nevertheless a hasty set up, as they could reach cover. Emphasis on the superior firepower of the enemy.
Ordered immediate assault to the long flank by organic 917-1 squad (1SQ), while the rest of the 1PLT rolled up the "long arm of L". Caught glimpse of the enemy: fire-team movement, ballistic armour.
End with being shot - numbness spreading from wounds, then intense burning sensation, then pain.
Narrator text giving brief explanation of the role of 917-1 in MF tactics. Big picture description of combat which resulted in the annihilation of 1SQ. Despite loss of 1PL, surviving squads in 1PLT continued pushing up the treeline.
Testimony of Commander Hong 2
While he couldn't figure out what 1PLT was up to due to a lack of radio (mention platoon does not have radio in MF table of equipment), Hong knows shit was hitting the fan due to intense gunfire in the area. Company then got hammered by precision 60mm mortar fire, making the situation obvious.
Radio in the Battalion. Contrast radioman's oblivious tone with Hong's abrupt raging response. We are fucking under attack! Battalion Commander got woken up and was all fired up. Started to mobilise the battalion. Mention rackets and shouts in background to underscore the mobilisation.
Narrator goes on with the battle. 1PLT lost half its strength (including the entire 917-1 squad) but remained in the fight against the "long arm of L"; 2PLT moved in to assist; 3PLT and Coy HQ moved to a rocky feature on the right of the main avenue of approach to establish a base of fire against "the short arm of L".
Enemy in treeline was peeling back to the north. Losses unknown.
Narrator text describes the status of battalion deployment. The battalion were fully mobilized in 20 mins. One company and all fire support platoons were sent up, ETA 35 mins; 82mm mortars in position in 25 mins. Last company remain stand-by in base.
Testimony of Commander Hong 3
Remove Uighur "separatists" and Church of Malthus "cultist" from deduction of who's the enemy. "Everyone can pull an ambush, but" separatist tends to hit and run, plus it's too much of a coincidence for separatist to show up on anomalous site; cultist is fanatical but not that well-trained and well-armed. Plus, you would expect some of them to morph a claw out of their arm by now. That leaves only 'foreign mercenary from the RPC group'.
Evaluate possible enemy capability. Hasty set up and short width of ambush zone indicate no more than platoon strength. Use of 60mm mortar and interior location points to lightly equipped heli-borne unit. The defense was likely a delaying operation meant to buy time.
Dilemma: 1PLT mangled with the enemy inside the woods and therefore disabled enemy mortar fire on it, but it would take time before it pushed to the attack line toward the hill, at which point it would be attitried more heavily than it already was; 2PLT was on the move and couldn't be diverted away; 3PLT was laying fire at the hill, but any movement on the open ground risked mortar fire.
Hong was all for waiting for the battalion supports to show up. Meanwhile, he would send a request up-chain for PLAAF air patrol to prevent enemy escape. "18th Air Regiment stations ██km away. J-10C could arrive in 5 mins." He does however note that it was a "less bad" option due to the PCAAO-PLA rivalry.
Go into detail about the rivalry here.
Against Hong's reluctance, Li advised sending out 3PLT's 917-1 squad across the open field as bait to divert/ expose enemy sniper fire. Li points out that other enemy personnel was probably digging up the anomaly on the other side of the hill. Time is running out. But Hong realised his true motive is to not get PLA involved due to the petty interservice rivalry.
Argument trigger Hong's war memory. Describe his sympathy on 917-1 instances due to experience of comradeship under fire during Laoshan 1984. (hinting at final verdict).
He may have learnt about war from books and movies, but he doesn't know war. I was his age when I dragged my men's bodies back to our line in Laoshan '84. The Vietnamese fired upon us from up the hill. We had nothing back there, nothing but our brothers. Without them, you would never know when someone lobbed a grenade from an unseen tunnel hole, or when a rifle barrel came out from the grass. My brothers had to die in the war because there was no other way. It wasn't the case on that night. We were going to have everything if we just use some damn patience.
Those “clones”, or whatever you call them, they may be as stoic as if they have been shell-shocked, but they bleed just like we do, and they sure as hell did their job watching our backs. Clones or not, they are first and foremost my men. But a kid like Li will never understand it.
It wasn’t like I and Li never had any disagreement before, but it was never that explicit, and it made everyone quiet. My men looked at each other uneasily. I know we were supposed to display unity, but gunfire was clattering out there while we were wasting time here. I tried to reason with him using language he understood. I told him that it would be unwise to throw away our fighting strength prematurely, that each man contributes to our firepower. Do you know what he say?
“Are they men?”
Narrator text the 917-1 squad was sent out as per to Li’s plan. It advanced in skirmish line firing on the move, while the rest of the platoon provided cover. The platoon’s sharpshooters scanned the northern hill for targets. Sharpshooters managed to silent (not necessarily kill) the enemy sniper team after the loss of most of the squad and some soldiers in the platoon.
Testimony of 3PLT Commander
Describe his impression of the 917-1’s mindless death march. Mentions that he doesn’t really like those weird identical freaks, but the carnage shook him. Behind him, Hong and Li were quarrelling with each other. The 917-1 squad was picked out one by one, who kept pace forward obliviously to their death, despite heavy suppressive fire. On top of the erupting fires, he yelled at a sharpshooter's ear to hurry his search. Emphasise on how the 917-1 instances and some soldiers beside him dropped "in rhythm", which prompted them to keep their heads down and caused a break in the firing. The sharpshooter was down. A round lodged between his eyebrows. 3PL had to make his way through the firing line to the sharpshooter in another squad, who eventually exclaimed: "I fucking got him!".
3PL called cease fire. The remaining 917-1 was still advancing and firing, but no one hit them this time. It was Li, not Hong, who gave the order for 3PLT to advance, the latter seemed defeated and did not say a word. With overwatch from 3SQ, 2SQ and 3PL moved across the 1km open field to link up with 1SQ. 3SQ is to stay behind.
Testimony of Commander Hong 4
Introduction of Political Instructor Li. Feeling that he's not good in his job due to youth and inexperience. "I think he was not there yet.": Frail nanfanren (Southern Chinese), poor guanxi people skills, unenthusiastic 'by the book', 'bare minimum' work attitude. Note however cordial relations with the lab boys in Research, leads to elaboration of US background.
Interviewer mentions Li's past education in the US with regards to Li's poor guanxi. Hong goes into detail about it. Mention the experience in the US paradoxically made Li a better patriot due to experiencing the rot of US society first hand. Respect him for joining the service even though on the easier political track, particularly when he can bang chick in America for the rest of his life as a guanerdai (官二代).
That being said, I must call into question Commander Hong’s suitability as an officer in the Mobile Formation. The Party teaches us: “we must strengthen the armed forces with science and technology; and we must build up our military strength with political strength.” While military professionalism is certainly important, PCAAO's role as the pioneer in the anomalous domain of the national defense call upon him to resolutely uphold scientific principles and the Party's leadership. Regrettably, he violated the former and put the latter in risk.
It is a scientific fact that Anomaly 917-1 instances are not human beings, and should not be treated as such. This fact was proven beyond doubts in the field manual enclosed in Attachment Ji, as well as countless other scientific papers published by Research. By treating 917-1 instances sentimentally, Commander Hong allowed his past war experience to prejudice against established scientific facts and the innovative war-fighting tactics derived from it. This reluctance considerably degraded his company's effectiveness in ██████ ████. As both war veteran and experienced Party member, he should have known better.
It also concerns me that our friends in the CMC seem to express unusual level of interests over this incident. If they do try to exploit it at the PCAAO's expanse, as I fear, you will have to plan your response carefully. To counter them now in the face of blatant foreign aggression will unfortunately cause bad optics. You will have to swallow it, but you need not give too many grounds. I recommend the following steps to demonstrate that, while the PCAAO will admit failure, they will not tell you what to do with your men:
- Surrender ██████ ████ to PLA authority. They can have the dead land, but we will not help them clean up the mess this time.
- Promote Commander Hong to a nominal position in somewhere harmless, which he will occupy until retirement.
- Promote Instructor Li to the full battalion position of Political Director, and fast-track his progression to the rank of Major.
I wrote these words with the understanding that it is outside the scope of this investigation. As your long time comrade and friend from the barrack days, however, I feel compelled to offer my advice in these difficult time. Please allow my observations to contribute to your judgement in this matter.
Your Old Friend,
Zhang Yen
Comrade Commissar,
I regret to inform you that our operation in ██████ ████ has ended in failure. The commando unit from the 195th have not lived up to its reputation. The 18th Air Regiment has reported the successful interception of the “RPC aircraft”. This should be enough damage control for now.
Fortunately, the situation is not unsalvageable. I am mobilising my contacts in the CCDI to stir up the mess. The ensuing fuss and hustle will hopefully cover up our trail. If we do it right, we may even put those upstarts into the Boss’s crosshair and regain what was rightfully ours. Both of us will have a lot of works to do in the coming days.
I await the reborn of our Special Directorate.
Salutation
Xu Bing